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The overall aim of this two-part paper is to provide a supplement to ability theories of practice in terms of a 
defense of the following thesis: Individuals’ ability to act appropriately sometimes depends on their 
exercise of the ability directly to perceive normative states. In Part I, I presented the account of direct 
perception. In this Part II of the paper, I argue that, by the lights of this account, normative states are 
sometimes directly perceptible. Also, I show that the ability directly to perceive normative states is a 
commonly possessed – and exercised – ability. On this basis, I establish the conclusion that, in situations of 
social interaction, individuals’ ability to act appropriately is sometimes underwritten by their exercise of the 
ability directly to perceive normative states. By way of ending, I briefly explain the different ways in which 
my discussion constitutes both a useful supplement to ability theories of practice and a reply to an 
important objection raised against these theories.   
Keywords: practices, norms, perception, abilities, normative states 
1. The Ability Directly to Perceive Normative States 
In part I of this paper, I presented the account of direct perception. It is compatible with the assumption 
that everyday phenomena, such as tomatoes and their being ripe, are directly perceptible. By appeal to this 
account, I now take on the task of showing that normative states are sometimes directly perceptible too. 
More specifically, I arguethat if it is granted that everyday phenomena, such as tomatoes and their being 
ripe, are directly perceptible, then, in light of the account of direct perception, it follows that normative 
states are sometimes directly perceptible too. The development of the account of direct perception 
involved a discussion of perception first as state, then as process. I proceed in a parallel manner when 
examining whether normative states are sometimes directly perceptible.   
 
Perception as State: True Beliefs about Normative States 
According to the account of direct perception, perceptual states are true beliefs to the effect that the 
environment in front of one’s eyes is a certain way. It must now be shown that individuals sometimes form 
true beliefs about normative states that fit this characterization. A single example will do to make this 
point. Consider an individual who is sitting in a crowded bus. She is looking in the direction of the bus door 
when an elderly person enters. It is uncontroversial to maintain that the individual may form the true belief 
that the situation makes it appropriate for her to offer her bus seat to the elderly person. In this manner, 
the example brings out that individuals may form true beliefs to the effect that the environment in front of 
their eyes makes some action appropriate or inappropriate.   
 
Perception as Process: Stimulation of the Retinal Cells 
Turning to perception as process, the account of direct perception has it that in perception the 
environment causes the stimulation of individuals’ retinal cells via the light it emits and reflects. It is quite 
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clear that individuals’ true beliefs about normative states may be caused by the environment in this 
fashion. 
 To see this, notice that situations of social interaction may cause individuals to form true 
belief about the normative states of these situations. Or put differently, individuals respond to situations of 
social interaction by forming true beliefs to the effect that a given situation makes some action appropriate 
or inappropriate. Once this is realized, it is only a small step to see that environments may cause 
individuals’ beliefs via the stimulation of their retinal cells: Individuals’ use of their eyes alone may suffice 
for the generation of these beliefs.1 Return for a moment to the bus example. The individual is sitting with a 
view to the entrance in the crowded bus. When the bus stops, an elderly person enters. The situation here 
causes the individual to form the belief that she should offer the elderly person her seat. The individual 
only has to make use of her eyes to arrive at this belief.2 Generalizing from this example, it is reasonable to 
hold that situations of social interaction may, via the light they emit and reflect, cause the stimulation of 
individuals’ retinal cells such that they form true beliefs to the effect that the situation in front of their eyes 
makes some action appropriate or inappropriate. Accordingly, true beliefs about normative states may be 
brought about in a way that accords with the first part of the specification of perception as process.  
 
Perception as Process: Noninferential Acquisition 
There is also the second part of the characterization of perception as process. It states that the stimulation 
of individuals’ retinal cells initiates a process that does not involve any inferential activity among 
conceptual representations before it culminates in a perceptual belief. It must further be demonstrated 
that true beliefs about normative states may meet this condition. From what has been said so far, this is 
not obvious. The discussion has only shown that perception may play a role in the generation of true beliefs 
about normative states insofar as these beliefs may be caused by the environment via the stimulation of 
individuals’ retinal cells. Yes this point is compatible with holding that these true beliefs about normative 
states are not perceptual because they are inferentially acquired. First I dwell at some length on this point 
and show how inferential activity may be involved in the formation of true beliefs about normative states. 
Then I move on to argue that true beliefs about normative states may be noninferentially acquired too.  
In order to present the idea that inferential activity contributes to the formation of true 
beliefs about normative states, it is useful to clarify two issues: What kinds of properties of an environment 
make the performance of a given action appropriate or inappropriate? And what kinds of properties must 
individuals have in order for an environment to make it appropriate or inappropriate for them to act in a 
given manner? 
To begin with the environment, there are various kinds of properties of an environment that, 
either on their own or in combination, partly make the performance of an action appropriate or 
inappropriate. These include the setting in which the acting individual finds herself, the objects present, the 
social status of the other individuals present, their physical/biological characteristics, and/or the actions or 
activities in which they are engaged:  
 
                                                          
1
 Henceforth, I shall talk interchangeably about the stimulation of individuals’ retinal cells and individuals making use 
of their eyes.  
2
 Needless to say, this should not be taken to imply that individuals in situations of this kind may not – and do not – 
make use of their other senses. Moreover, the point is compatible with the observation that in many situations of 
social interaction, individuals’ use of their eyes is insufficient or even dispensable when it comes to the formation of 
beliefs about normative states.   
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- A setting is exemplified by a bus, a lecture hall, a school, a beach, Pittsburgh, the US, and a Western 
country. Settings may (partly) make an action appropriate or inappropriate: Being on the beach 
makes it appropriate for women to wear a bikini only, whereas being in a church makes the same 
attire highly inappropriate.3 
- An object is exemplified by a table, a chair, an altar, a throne, and a fork. Objects may (partly) make 
an action appropriate or inappropriate: Something being a table makes it inappropriate to put 
one’s feet on it, just as something being a fork makes it appropriate to put it in the mouth.  
- A social status is exemplified by being a passenger, a guest, a queen, a policeman, a priest, a 
member of the local chess club, a pedestrian, and an American. Somebody else’s social status may 
(partly) make it appropriate or inappropriate for an individual to act in a certain manner: Somebody 
being a queen makes it appropriate to address her with “your majesty.” 
- A physical/biological characteristic is exemplified by being old, young, a man, a woman, and fat. 
Somebody else’s physical/biological characteristic may (partly) make it appropriate or 
inappropriate for an individual to act in a certain manner: A person being old makes it appropriate 
for an individual to offer the old person her bus seat if there are no available seats.4 
- An action or activity is exemplified by reading, sleeping, stepping onto the bus, cleaning the table, 
asking for the salt, soccer games, dinner parties, lectures, and wedding ceremonies. Somebody else 
being engaged in a certain action or activity may (partly) make it appropriate or inappropriate for 
an individual to act in a certain manner: A wedding ritual taking place makes it appropriate to act in 
a non-disturbing manner. Likewise, entering the room where a friend’s children are peacefully 
asleep makes it appropriate to lower one’s voice. 
 
I shall refer to these properties as the normatively relevant aspects of environments. Notice that it is 
typically possible directly to see that something is a bus, a beach, a table, or an altar; that somebody is a 
policeman on duty, a nurse on duty, or a pedestrian; that somebody is old, young, a man, or a woman; that 
somebody is asleep, or is sitting; that a wedding ceremony or a football game is taking place, and so on. In 
sum, many normatively relevant aspects of environments are directly perceptible: They fall in the category 
of everyday phenomena that qualify as directly perceptible according to the account of direct perception.  
  Turning to individuals, they have different kinds of properties that may, either singly or in 
combination, make it the case that an environment makes it appropriate or inappropriate for them to act in 
a given manner. Most notably, these properties are their social status, their physical/biological 
characteristics, and the action or activities in which they are engaged. Here are some examples of the role 
these may play: 
 
- Social status: Being the host at a dinner party makes it inappropriate to be the first to serve oneself 
some food: The guests should begin. Being a passenger on an airplane makes it appropriate to 
return to one’s seat when told to do so by the stewardess.  
                                                          
3
 It goes without saying that whether being on a beach makes it appropriate for women to wear nothing but a bikini 
depends on whether the beach is located in, say, a Western country. Here, and in the following, I ignore complications 
of this sort.  
4
 Whether an individual is counted as old or as skinny is to an important extent a matter of convention. Referring to 
individuals’ being old, skinny, and the like as their physical/biological characteristics should be seen as being perfectly 
compatible with this point.  
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- Physical/biological characteristics: Being young and healthy makes it appropriate for an individual, 
in a crowded bus, to offer her seat to an elderly person. Being a woman makes it inappropriate to 
sit with one’s legs spread.  
- Action/activity: Sitting down makes it appropriate to offer one’s bus seat to an elderly person 
standing up in the crowded bus. Being in the midst of finishing the preparation of the dinner makes 
it appropriate to leave it to one’s partner to welcome the guests when they arrive.  
 
I shall refer to these properties as the normatively relevant standings of individuals. Even if the normatively 
relevant standings of acting individuals are perceptible, it is only rarely that they take advantage of this 
opportunity. Typically, an individual does not look down herself to determine that she is a doctor or 
whether she is a man or a woman.  
In light of these considerations, the proposal that the generation of true beliefs about normative 
states involves inferential activity may be specified as follows: The environment causes individuals, via the 
stimulation of their retinal cells, to form perceptual beliefs about one or several of its normatively relevant 
aspects. These beliefs combine with suitable background beliefs. Usually, the latter include individuals’ 
beliefs about their normatively relevant standings and previously acquired beliefs about normatively 
relevant aspects of the environment. On this basis, individuals infer that the environment in front of their 
eyes makes some action appropriate or inappropriate. This line of thinking may be illustrated by way of the 
bus example: First, the individual forms the perceptual belief that an elderly person enters the bus. The 
individual combines her perceptual belief with background beliefs to the effect that she is sitting down, 
that she is young and generally fit to stand up, and that there are no free seats. Together these beliefs 
allow her to infer that she should offer the elderly person her bus seat. There is no doubt that true beliefs 
about normative states may be brought about in this fashion.  Still, this is far from always the case. 
Sometimes true beliefs about normative states are not the upshot of either conscious, nonconscious, or 
weakly unconscious inferential activity.5 Or, so I shall now argue.  
To begin with, environments may cause individuals, via the stimulation of their retinal cells, 
to form true beliefs about normative states without these beliefs being the result of conscious inferential 
activity, that is, inferential activity which is actively noticed. For instance, suppose that an individual is 
sitting in a crowded bus facing the bus door where an elderly person enters. This individual may react to 
the situation by instantaneously forming the belief that she should offer her bus seat to the elderly person. 
She simply finds herself with this belief. In this manner, true beliefs about normative states are sometimes 
phenomenologically immediate.  
Also, but perhaps less evidently, environments may cause individuals, via the stimulation of 
their retinal cells, to acquire true beliefs about normative states without any nonconscious inferential 
activity taking place either. Recall that when individuals engage in nonconscious inferential activity, they do 
not notice this activity. Still, they might effortless have done so: It would only require them to pay attention 
to the matter. Against this background, consider the following scenario: Individuals who are used to Danish 
traffic signals are enrolled in an experiment. In the first part of the experiment, it is ensured that when they 
are placed in front of a cross walk, they do not engage in conscious inferential activity: They do not actively 
notice any conceptual representation of the little green man and a move from there to the belief that it is 
appropriate to walk. In the second part, they are once more placed in front of the cross walk where the 
                                                          
5
 The possibility that strongly unconscious activity occurs does not need to be rejected. As explained in Part I of this 
paper, there is no such thing as strongly unconscious inferential activity among conceptual representations.  
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little man turns green. This time, they are given the task of attending to whether they engage in inferential 
activity in order to acquire the true belief that it is appropriate to traverse the cross walk. It is quite clear, I 
think, that most, if not all, of the participants in the experiment will answer that they detect no inferential 
activity.6 Generalizing from this example, it is reasonable to hold that an environment may cause 
individuals, via the stimulation of their retinal cells, to acquire true beliefs about normative states without 
these beliefs being the upshot of either conscious or nonconscious inferential activity.     
The last option to be examined is whether environments may cause individuals, via the 
activation of their retinal cells, to acquire true beliefs about normative states without the occurrence of any 
weakly unconscious inferential activity. The latter is inferential activity which individuals do not actively 
notice unless they make a sustained effort in this direction. So, consider again the experiment with the 
individuals who are used to Danish traffic signals. Assume that it has already been determined that the 
participants do not engage in conscious or nonconscious inferential activity. On that basis, the participants 
are presented with a third task: They are required to make a sustained effort to notice whether their belief 
that it is appropriate to traverse the cross walk is the result of inferential activity. For instance, they may be 
placed several times in front of a cross walk where the little man turns green. Each time they are then 
invited to notice whether they engage in inferential activity. Or, they may be encouraged to train their 
ability to concentrate on the task of noticing inferential activity. Once they have done so, they are then 
expected to come back and go through the experiment again. Despite making such a sustained effort, I 
submit, most, if not all, of the participants in the experiment will answer that they do still not detect any 
inferential activity. And similar experiments, I think, will yield the same result. In this fashion, an 
environment may cause individuals, via the stimulation of their retinal cells, to acquire true beliefs about 
normative states without these beliefs being the upshot of either conscious, nonconscious, or weakly 
unconscious inferential activity. The finding means that beliefs about normative states may be brought 
about in a way that also fits the second part of the characterization of perception as process.7  
There are no further requirements mentioned in the account of direct perception. 
Consequently, it may be concluded that, by the lights of the account, there are situations of social 
interaction in which individuals qualify as directly perceiving normative states. Everyday phenomena such 
as tomatoes and their being ripe, are not alone in meeting the necessary and sufficient conditions stated by 
the account of direct perception.  Sometimes, these conditions are met by normative states as well. 
Moreover, it is fair to think that individuals may become reliably able to form perceptual beliefs about 
normative states. In situations of social interaction, they may possess – and exercise – the ability directly to 
perceive that the situation makes it appropriate for them to act in a given manner. For instance, they may 
                                                          
6
 The reader is invited to verify this claim by carrying out this, or a similar, experiment herself. In fact, I am using the 
cross walk example because it is a situation which the reader may easily seek out in order to confirm the claim that 
she will not, effortlessly, notice any inferential activity taking place. In this spirit, the reader is also invited to perform 
the next experiment to be discussed.   
7
 In connection with the point that true beliefs about normative states may be inferentially acquired, it was noticed 
that background beliefs may figure as premises in these inferences. Background beliefs may also be assigned a role in 
the generation of noninferentially acquired true beliefs about normative states. More precisely, it may be maintained 
that individuals’ background beliefs somehow penetrate the process which result in their perceptual beliefs about 
normative states. Or, it may be insisted that there are nonconceptual representational states and/or 
nonrepresentational states that fill in the same causal role as that assigned to background beliefs. For the present 
purpose, there is no need to take a stance on this complicated issue. It suffices to notice that it is typically the case 
that individuals’ true noninferentially acquired beliefs about normative states may, at the very least, be construed as if 
penetrated by background beliefs. 
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directly perceive that they should offer their seat to an elderly person, that they should say “thank you,” 
that they should greet another person by saying “hi,” that they should to stand in line, and that they should 
refrain from stripping naked.  
 
2. The Common Ability Directly to Perceive Normative States 
In order to ensure a fuller appreciation of the conclusion just reached, it is worth briefly to pause and 
consider to what extent the ability directly to perceive normative states is commonly acquired and 
exercised.  To this end, I shall briefly discuss two ways in which individuals may acquire this ability.  
 One possibility is that an individual is first told how to infer the presence of a normative state 
from, among other things, the directly perceptible normatively relevant aspects of an environment. She 
begins to draw the suggested inference whenever she finds herself in that kind of situation. Then, after a 
period of training, the individual ceases to draw any conscious inference. Moreover, she does not draw any 
nonconscious or weakly unconscious inference either: Even if she were to pay attention to the matter, she 
would not, effortlessly or after making a sustained effort, notice any inferential activity taking place. At this 
point she sees, rather than infers, that the situation makes some action appropriate or inappropriate. She 
has become reliably able noninferentially to acquire the belief. An example may serve to illustrate this 
point. Assume that an individual is told that when she is sitting down in a crowded bus and an elderly 
person enters, she should offer her seat to that person. For a start, she draws the inference whenever she 
finds herself in that situation. Then, after a while, she becomes reliably able noninferentially to acquire the 
belief that she should offer an elderly person her seat. In other words, as the result of being repeatedly 
exposed to acting in that kind of situation, she acquires the ability directly to perceive that the situation 
makes it appropriate for her to act in this manner.  
Another possibility is that individual is not directly told how to infer that some action is 
appropriate or inappropriate. Instead, all she has to go on is how competent individuals act and express 
approval and disapproval of others’ actions. This is the most common situation. Here, the individual is likely 
to pick up on how it is appropriate or inappropriate to act insofar as she is repeatedly exposed to 
competent individuals’ actions and their reactions to others’ actions, including her own. More specifically, 
as she becomes used to acting in a given kind of situation, she is likely to begin, and eventually become 
reliably able, noninferentially to form true beliefs about the corresponding normative states. For instance, a 
little girl may see how her parents and other adults tend to offer their bus seat to elderly persons. Likewise, 
she may notice how they express their approval or disapproval of the manner in which she and others act 
in this situation: Her parents and other adults may make comments along the lines of “that was nice of the 
young man to offer his seat to the old woman” and “you should get up so that the old woman can sit 
down.” Also, they may smile approvingly when she rises to her feet so that an elderly person can sit down. 
At some point, she is likely to catch on: She becomes able directly to perceive that a situation of that kind 
makes it appropriate for her to offer her bus seat to an elderly person. 
Insofar as these accounts are recognized as plausible stories of how perceptual learning may 
take place, the following appears to be the case: It is first and foremost if individuals have been repeatedly 
exposed to acting in a given kind of situation of social interaction that they are likely to have – and exercise 
– the ability directly to perceive normative states. Since there are many kinds of social interaction that 
individuals take part in very often, even on a daily basis, the ability directly to perceive normative states 




3. The Ability to Act Appropriately  
There is only a small – and highly plausible – step from the claim that individuals sometimes have the ability 
directly to perceive normative states to the main contention that their exercise of this ability sometimes 
underwrites their ability to act appropriately. Consider the bus case one last time: An individual is on a 
crowded bus. An elderly person enters and the individual forms the perceptual belief that she should offer 
her seat to this person. It is reasonable to hold that it is this belief that, partially at least, causes her 
subsequent appropriate action: She gets up while saying to the old person “please, you can sit here.” In a 
similar vein, it is fair to think that an individual’s perceptual belief that she should, say, stand in line in the 
supermarket, say “thank you” upon receiving a gift, or greet another person by saying “hi” is what, partially 
at least, causes her subsequent appropriate actions. Generalizing from these cases, the thesis defended in 
the present paper may be regarded as vindicated: In situations of social interaction, individuals’ ability to 
act appropriately sometimes depends on their exercise of the ability directly to perceive the 
appropriateness of actions.  
 
4. The Thesis as Supplement and Defense 
By way of ending, I should like briefly to discuss different ways in which the defense of my thesis is of 
importance to ability theorists of practice. 
 Most obviously, the supplement opens to ability theorists one approach to the study of 
particular practices that involve social interaction: Ability theorists should examine individuals’ ability to act 
appropriately from the perspective of its being sometimes a function of their exercise of the ability directly 
to perceive normative states. Sometimes, ability theorists will then be able to explain individuals’ 
appropriate ways of acting by appeal to their direct perception of corresponding normative states. An 
account along these lines brings into view how individuals being reliably able to act appropriately is a 
matter of their constantly attuning to, or being responsive to, the environment in which they find 
themselves. By implication, attention is directed to the fact that the ability to act appropriately cannot be 
understood and explained apart from the environment in which it is exercised. These are important insights 
that ability theorists may bring to the field, and apply, when studying specific practices of social interaction.  
Ability theorists may also make use of the supplement in another way. It includes an account 
of the ability directly to perceive something to be the case. Evidently, individuals do not merely exercise 
this ability in relation to normative states. They directly perceive a lot of other things to be the case too. 
Moreover, individuals exercise their ability directly to perceive something to be the case in many other 
situations than those involving social interaction. This being the case, ability theorists may avail themselves 
of the account of direct perception in many other contexts of study. For instance, an ability theorist may 
want to study practices specified as scientific practices. The account of perception may here put the ability 
theorist in a better position to understand and explain scientists’ perceptual abilities and the role these 
play when they carry out their scientific activities.  
These considerations point to two reasons why the supplement is useful to ability theorists 
in their study of practices. Additionally, the supplement may serve as a response to an important type of 
objection launched against theories of practice in general. In his very influential and highly critical book, The 
Social Theory of Practices, Stephen Turner states that the notion of practice “is deeply elusive” (Turner 
1994:2). Moreover, he contends that any attempt to turn the notion into a clear and useful concept is 
doomed to fail: “The idea of ‘practice’ and its cognates has this odd kind of promissory utility. They promise 
that they can be turned into something more precise. But the value of the concepts is destroyed when they 
8 
 
are pushed in the direction of meeting their promise” (ibid.:116).8 Though Turner exaggerates, I think he is 
right that theories of practice may benefit from further clarification and elaboration. Yet, as opposed to 
Turner, I believe that the task may be carried out successfully. And what is more, I take the supplement I 
have offered to prove this point. The supplement provides a detailed specification of a special kind of 
practices, namely practices of social interaction: It offers an analysis of individuals’ ability to act 
appropriately as this ability relates to, and is a function of, the ability directly to perceive normative states. 
The analysis clearly enhances, rather than destroys, the value of ability approaches. In this fashion, the 
supplement is a powerful answer to the kind of criticism advanced by Turner. It demonstrates that, in this 
respect at least, the basic ability approach is a viable approach: It is far from being an unpromising research 
program within social theorizing.  
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 It may be noticed that Turner also raises a number of more specific objections to theories of practice. Space does not 
permit a discussion of these other objections. In my view, they do not apply to ability theories of practice as I have 
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